Security proof of practical quantum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a lot of attentions in recent years. Most of real-life QKD implementations are based on phase-coding BB84 protocol, which usually uses Unbalanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (UMZI) as the information coder and decoder. However, the long arm and short arm of UMZI will introduce different loss in practical experimental realizations, the state emitted by Alice's side is nolonger standard BB84 states. In this paper, we will give a security analysis in this situation. Counterintuitively, active compensation for this different loss will only lower the secret key bit rate.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution [1] [2] is the art of allowing two distant parties Alice and Bob to remotely establish a secret key combining with an authenticated classical channel and a quantum channel. The unconditional security of quantum key distribution bases on fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. The unconditional security of QKD protocol with perfect experimental setup (the source is perfect single photon source and so on) has been respectively given by Lo, Chau [3] , Shor, Preskill [4] , Renner [5] et al. Furthermore, Gottesman, Lo, Lukenhaus and Preskill (GLLP) [6] have given an analysis of security of QKD bases on practical source. In their security analysis, the final secret key bit can be generated if we can estimate the lower bound of the secret key bits generated by the single-photon pulse. More recently, Scarani [7] has analyzed security of QKD with finite resources. Meanwhile, the experimental realization about QKD also has a rapid progress in recent years [8] In practical quantum key distribution realizations, UMZI [15] [16] [17] method is commonly used. However, the Phase Modulator (PM) in the interferometer is not perfect, which means it will introduce much more loss than the arm has no PM. As a result, in this case photon states emitted by Alice's side is not the standard BB84 state (we call it unbalanced states in the next section), which means security of quantum key distribution based on this states can not be satisfied with GLLP formula. Of course, one can give a simple security proof when the loss of the PM is considered as an operation controlled by Eve and then GLLP can be used to calculate the final secret key rate. However, the secret key rate in this case is not optimal.
To give an optimal security proof of QKD with unbalanced BB84 states, we propose that the real-life source can be replaced by a virtual source without lowering security of the protocol, then the final secret key rate can be improved obviously.
II. QKD WITH UNBALANCED MACH-ZEHNDER INTERFEROMETER
In this section, we will introduce the general QKD setup with UMZI method, a schematic of this QKD setup can be illustrated as in Fig. 1 . In Alice's half-interferometer, there is a Phase Modulator (PM) in the long arm. Correspondingly, the weak coherent state entering the quantum channel can be divided into coherent state from the short arm and from the long arm respectively, both of them can be given as the following,
where, |α s is the weak coherent states in the short arm, |β l is the weak coherent states in the long arm after the PM, |n s is the n photon state in the short arm, |n l is the n photon state in the long arm after the PM, µ denotes the mean photon number of the short arm, ν denotes the mean photon number of the long arm, e iϕ is the phase modulated by the PM in the long arm. e iθ is selected uniformly at random because of Eve has no prior knowledge of the phase. Combining with Lo and Preskill's method of phase randomization in Ref. [18] , the density matrix of the state emitted by Alice is
where, µ + ν is the mean photon number in the quantum channel emitted by Alice, a + is the creation operator. We have given the practical state as in equations (4,5), thus the practical single photon state after the PM is (the phase of the photon from the long arm is randomly modulated by 0, 0.5π, π, 1.5π)
The long arm and short arm have the same loss in the ideal case, which means PM in Alice's side is perfect, thus we can get µ = ν. However, the long arm will introduce much more loss than the short arm in practical side, which means µ > ν in practice, the state emitted by Alice's side becomes unbalanced correspondingly.
For simplicity, the practical PM can be replaced by a perfect PM plus an unbalanced attenuator, the unbalanced attenuator only attenuate the photon from the long arm, while the photon from the short arm can be past without any attenuation. Since the single photon state in this case is not the perfect BB84 state for the eavesdropper Eve, formula for the final secret key rate (GLLP) can not be satisfied in this case. To solve this problem, we will analyze the final secret key rate with practical UMZI method. For improving the final secret key rate, an unitary transformation will be proposed in the next section.
III. SECURITY OF QKD WITH UNBALANCED MACH-ZEHNDER INTERFEROMETER
In this section, we will first give a very simple security analysis of QKD with practical Unbalanced MachZehnder Interferometer. As mentioned in section II, the half-interferometer in Alice's side can be seen as an unbalanced attenuator in the quantum channel. A simple security proof in this case can be illustrated as the following.
We can simply assume the unbalanced attenuator is not controlled by Alice, which is part of the quantum 
where, P 1 = e −2µ 2µ is the probability distribution of the single photon state, α is the loss efficiency in the quantum channel, l is the fiber length, P A = µ+ν 2µ is the pass efficiency in Alice's side, P B = ν µ+ν is the pass efficiency in Bob's side. Therefore, according to secret key rate formula GLLP, the final secret key bit rate is just the key rate with ideal PM but is lowered by the attenuation constant ν/µ.
However, the final secret key rate is low in this case. For improving the final secret key rate, an unitary transformation will be proposed as in Fig. 2 . We will prove the practical state, as in equation (6), is as security as standard BB84 states by considering the practical state is equal to the standard BB84 state combining with an unitary transformation.
The unitary transformation in our paper is an virtual setup, which does not need to be implemented in practical QKD experimental realization, the detailed illustration of the unitary transformation is given as the following,
where, |0 A , |1 A are mutually orthogonal states in Alice's system, which are unknown to Alice. The pass efficiency of the single photon states is P suc = µ+ν 2µ . The practical photon state in Alice's side can be seen as the standard BB84 state emitted by a virtual source combining with the unitary transformation. Then security of practical QKD setup is equal to security of QKD with the virtual source. Combining with the method given in Ref. [6] , we can prove the unconditional security of new source QKD in the following.
As mentioned in section II, the probability that single photon unbalanced states emitted by Alice's side is e −(µ+ν) (µ + ν). Combining with the unitary transformation, the probability distribution of the single photon state of the virtual source emitted by Alice's side is
Similarly, the probability distribution of the vacuum state and multi-photon state of the virtual source can be given bỹ
Obviously, the real-life setup of Alice can be replaced by the virtual source and the basis-independent unitary transformation equivalently. According to GLLP, the basis-independent unitary transformation cannot lower the security of the QKD with the virtual source, then we can calculate the upper bound of the secret key bit rate, that isp 1 p suc 10 −αl 10 P B = e µ+ν (µ + ν)10 −αl 10 ν µ+ν (11) Comparing with equation (7), upper bound of the secret key bit rate can be improved e µ−ν times with our security analysis. From equation (11), we can see the real-life unbalanced single photon states can be generated from standard single photon states safely. Therefore, security of the real-life unbalanced single photon states is the same as standard single photon states, and GLLP formula is satisfied in this situation. Combining with our security analysis, one click of one real-life unbalanced single photon states can bring one key bit safely.
One may argue that the problem can be taken away by adding the same PM on the short arm, which can be controlled by Alice. However, the same PM should be added in Bob's short arm for lowing the bit error rate in this case, thus the secret key rate is
where P ′ A = 1 is the pass efficiency in Alice's side, P ′ B = ν 2µ is the pass efficiency in Bob's side. Obviously, equation (12) is the same as equation (7), thus the secret key rate is lower comparing with our situation. On the other hand, all the unbalanced multi-photons emitted by Alice's side cannot carry any secret key bit, thus we can conclude that our key bit rate is optimal.
IV. SIMULATION
Similar to the method in Ref. [23] , we will give the simulation result of the lower bound of the final secret key rate by considering equations (9) and (10) in this section. The mean photon number of µ is 0.4 and the mean photon number of ν is 0.067 in the simulation. Combining with GYS [26] parameters, the simulation result can be shown in Fig. 3 . From the simulation result, we can see that the longest transmission distance can be improved obviously with our security analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed security of UMZI method QKD with practical phase modulator by introducing a virtual source and an unitary transformation in this paper. Correspondingly, the optimal key bit rate has been given with our security analysis. From the simulation result, we can see that our method can improve the final secret key rate obviously. Quite interestingly, if the different loss was compensated actively, the final secret key rate will be lower comparing with no compensation.
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